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result might be reached, in a proper case, as to any storekeeper.""' Finally,
the court's criterion that the plaintiff must allege that "the words were intended to have real meaning or serious effect"' is both vague and misleading.
How is one to show that another intended any meaning? What on the other
hand shows a "serious effect" better than severe emotional illness accompanied by physical injury? Surely the plaintiff's allegations that the defendant's conduct was either malicious or grossly reckless or done "with intent
to inflict great mental and emotional disutrbance . 6.3..",,
should be sufficient
under recent decisions holding responsible those who exercise extreme disregard for others and cause such injuries through reckless or outrageous conduct. The court's prescription for recovery is unrealistic in that the claims
stem from such multifarious situations. The more enlightened of the recent
cases have turned upon the following factors: (a) The conduct in general
should at least approach outrageousness or recklessness; (b)the emotional
illness should be severe and reasonable under all the circumstances; and
(c) if there is also physical injury, then recovery is all the more indicated.
The court failed to consider these factors sufficiently, particularly the last
one, in its first opportunity to recognize a right of recovery for intentionally
caused emotional distress.
JOHN P.

CORRICAN, JR.

WILLS: SATISFACTION OF DEBT BY A LEGACY
TO CREDITORS
The testator, petitioners' father, collected income belonging to the
petitioners, which over a period of time, he allegedly commingled with his
own assets. No accounting was ever made by the father of the affairs which
he handled on behalf of his sons. He bequeathed stocks and securities and
devised real estate of unascertained value to the petitioners. The circuit
court presumed the legacy was given in satisfaction of the indebtedness, and
ordered an election between the legacy and the satisfaction of the debt by
an action of accounting.' Held, on certiorari, no presumption arises that
a legacy to a creditor satisfies the creditor's claim. Lopez v. Lopez, 96 So.2d
463 Fla. 1957).
The general rule of construction, or the doctrine of satisfaction, 2 as it is
sometimes called, states that where a legacy is given to a creditor in an
61. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 Mich. L.
Rev. 874, 883 (1939).
62. Slocum v. Food Fair Stores, 100 So.2d 396, 398 (Fla. 1958).
63. Id., at 397.
1.The choice is compulsory between two inconsistent fights or claims where there
is a clear intention by the testator that the beneficiary shall not enjoy both. 2 STORY,
EQulTy JURISPRUDENCE § 1451 (14th ed. 1918).
2. A distinction must be made between the doctrine of satisfaction which is
employed with reference to legacies to creditors and the doctrine of satisfaction used in
other phases of will construction. ATKINSON, WILLS § 133 (2nd ed. 1953).
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amount equal to or greater than the debt, a presumption arises that the
legacy was given in satisfaction of the debt.3 The courts applied this rule
to cases involving legacies to creditors as early as 1705. 4 Although the doctrine is well established and often quoted, ' the courts rarely presume satisfaction ol the basis of the doctrine alone.' Vhen a legacy is devised to a
creditor and the testanientary intent is not expressed, the courts resort to one
of two rules of construction to determine whether the legacy is given in
satisfaction of the dcbt] The courts admit that the prestnlption is provided
by law and may not be the real intention of the testator, 8 but since no other
intention is apparent froii the will, the fiction is deemed a necessityY For
this reason, the prcsumption is casily rcbuttcd by slight circumstances which
may show that the testator intended to devise the legacy and also to allow
satisfaction of the debt froin the other assets of the estate. 0 Many courts
reason that the presumption of satisfaction imposes a hardship on the creditorlegatee because the benefit of the doubt created in the absence of express
intention is resolved in favor of the estate.' If the creditor-legatee seeks
to enforce hlis claim as a creditor, he cannot receive the legacy since the
requircment of election deprives him of the right to the legacy 2 The
jurisdictions which apply the general rule give few reasons for justifying its
application. The classical argument is that a testator is presumed to be just

3. "If one being indebted to another in a suni of money, does by his will give
him as great or greater suni of money than the debt amounts to, without taking
notice at all of the debt, that this shall be in satisfaction of the debt, so that lie
shall not receive both the debt and the legacy .... " Talbot v. Duke of Shrewsbury,
4 Ch. 394, 24 Eng. Rep. 177 (1714),
4. Brown v. Dawson, 4 Ch. 240, 24 Eng. Rep. 116 (1705). But see llerzog,
Legacies to Creditors and Satisfaction of Debt in Jewish Law, 6 '[riMp. L. Q. 87 (1931).
5. U. S.: Clover v. Patten, 165 U.S. 394 (1897); Ill.: Fetrow v. Krause, 61
Ill. App. 238 (1895); Ind.: Allen v. Etter, 92 hid. App. 297, 175 N.E. 286 (1931);
Ky.: Cloud v. Clinkirbeard, 47 Ky. (8 B. Mon.) 397 (1848); Md.: Addison v. Bowie,
36 Md. 606 (1829); Mass.: Stroung v. Williams, 12 Mass. 391 (1815); Alis.: Gilliamn
v. Brown, 43 Miss. 641 (1871); N. 1.: Patsoukaros v. Koliotis, 132 N.J. Eq. 87,
'26, A.2d 882 (1942), aff'd, 133 N.J. Eq. 37, 30 A.2d 27 (1942); N.Y.: Gillian]
Crary, 71 N.Y. 368 (1826); N.C.: \Vard v. Coffield, 16 N.C. 108 (1827); Ohio: Bowen
v. Bowen, 34 Ohio St. 164 (1877); Pa.: Byrne v. Byme, 3 S. & R. 52 (Pa. 1817);
R. I.: Harris v. Rhode Island Trust Co., 10 R.I. 313 (1872); S.C.: Sullivan v. Latimer,
38 S.C. 158, 17 S.E. 701 (1893); Tex.: Pitt v. Van Orden, 158 S.W. 1043 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1913); Vt.: Newell v. Keith, 11 Vt. 214 (1839); Va.: Swan v. Swan,
136 Va. 496, 117 S.E. 858 (1923); Wash.: Doty v. Spokane & Eastern Trust Co.,
146 Wash. 95, 261 Pac. 788 (1927); Wis.: Graves v. Mitchell, 90 Wis. 306, 63
N.W. 271 (1895).
6. See Cases Cited note 17 infra.
7. The rule produces the same effect as if the testator's intention had been
expressed. In re Blanch, 126 Misc. 421, 214 N.Y. Supp. 565 (Surr. Ct. 1926); Perry
v. Maxwell, 17 N.C. 488 (1834); Re Fletcher, 38 Ch. 1). 373 (1888).
S. Ibid.
9. The doctrine is merely a rule of construction and yields to the intention of
the testator when such is ascertainable. Clover v. Pattern, 165 U.S. 394 (1897);
Mitchell v. Vest, 157 Iowa 336, 136 N.W. 1054 (1912); Williams v. Crary, 21 N.Y.
444 (1830).
10. Ibid.
I1. Gilliam v. Brown, 43 Miss. 641 (1871).
12. See note I supra.
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(by paying his debts) before being generous (and devising legacies).1 3 This
argument has been answered by the suggestion that a testator could be presumed to be both just and generous,' 4 and some courts, therefore, allow both
a satisfaction of a debt and the legacy. 15
Historically, the courts ignored the factor of relationship between the
testator and the creditor-legatee when applying the presumption of satisfaction.' 6 In cases where the courts presumed satisfaction, however, in addition to the testator's failure to express his intention, certain facts as to the
relationship between the testator and the creditor-legatee made it obvious
that the testator had no intention to allow both a legacy and a satisfaction
of the debt. 7 In Swan v. Swan,'9 the testator entered into an ante-nuptial
contract promising certain money and property to his future spouse. The
parties were married, and later divorced. The testator remarried and shortly
before his death, he devised money and property to his first wife in terms and in
amounts closely resembling the terms of the ante-nuptial agreement. The
court held that the legacy was presumed to satisfy the debt. Vhen the relationship of the parties is close, the courts have greater difficulty in trying
to construe the testator's intention. The general rule, however, presumed
satisfaction to blood relations as impersonally as it did to strangers.' 9 Many
times a deserving legatee would be precluded from receiving his legacy
because he sought to enforce a creditor's claim against the estate.20 The
courts recognized the harshness of the general rule, and found ways to pre-

13. Annot., 86 A.L.R. 6 (1933).
14. "The rule itself is not founded in reason and often tends to defeat the
bounty of testators . . . able chancellors have thought is more agreeable to equity
Byrne v. Byre, 3 S. & R.
to construe the testator to be both just and generous.
54 (P2. 1817).
15. See note 24 infra.
16. Annot. 86 A.L.R. 6, at 12 (1933).
17. Ky.: Whitaker v. Whitaker, 166 Ky. 632, 179 S.W. 584 (1915); Mass.:
Allen v. Merwin, 121 Mass. 378 (1876); N.J.: Petrie v. Voorhees, 18 N.J. Eq. 285,
(1867); N.Y.: In re Seeley, 67 Misc. 358, 124 N.Y. Supp. 831 (Strr. Ct. 1910);
n re Pergament's Estate, 204 Misc. 384, 123 N.Y.S. 2d 150 (SuM. Ct. 1953), aff'd,
283 App. Div. 869, 129 N.Y.S. 2d 918 (1954); Herb's Estate, 163 Misc. 441, 296
N.Y. Supp. 491 (Surr. Ct. 1937); N.C.: Ward v. Coffield, 16 N.C. 108 (1827);
Va.: Swan v. Swan, 136 Va. 496, 117 S.E. 858 (1923); Wis.: Graves v. Mitchell, 90
Wis. 306, 63 N.W. 271 (1895); Eng.: Brown v. Dawson, 4 Ch. 240, 24 Eng.
Rep. 116 (1705).
18. 136 Va. 496, 117 S.E. 858 (1923).
19. See note 16 supra.

20. See note 1 supra.
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vent its application?'l The general rule has been conditioned by so many
23
exceptions, 2 2 that few cases could fall within the scope of the doctrine.
Dissatisfaction with the general rule resulted in its complete abandoninent in some jurisdictions, 24 where a diametrically opposite view was
adopted. 25 These jurisdictions hold that had the testator wanted the creditor-legatee to make an election, such intent could have been easily incorporated in the will.'" The burden is placed upon the estate to produce the
manifested intention in the will which would require the beneficiary to
make the election. 27 The other jurisdictions which do not like the general
rule, but have not gone so far as to adopt the modem rule, reach the same
result by applying one or more of the exceptions to the general rule.28 Since
the Florida Supreme Court has never ruled on this point before, the opinion
discussed the general rule and alluded to its shortcomings. It preferred,
however, to follow the minority and declared that no presumption should
arise that a legacy to a creditor was intended as a satisfaction of a debt, unless
the testator stated such an intention in the will.2 1 It noted that application of the general rule would have led to the sane result, since the amount
of the legacy and the amount of the debt were unliquidated, a' the legacy and
the debt were of a different nature, 1 the testator directed that his just debts
21. See note 13 sr/ra.
22. E.g., the doctrine was rebutted by proof of one or more of the following
circumstances: When the legacy and the deit are of a different nature, i.e., a legacy

of property where the debt was for the payment of money. Fetrow v. Krause, 61
Ill. App. 238 (1895); Huston v. Huston, 37 Iowa 668 (1873); Buckner v. Martin,
92 Ky. 304, 165 S.W. 665 (1914): When the purpose of the legacy is expressed
by the testator. Thompson v. Williams, 82 IIl. App. 29 (1899); Strong v. Williams,

12 Mass. 391 (1815). When the testator directs that his just debts be paid. Hollister
v. Old Colony Trust Co., 328 Mass. 225, i02 N.E. 2d 770 (1952); Re Hill's Estate,
230 Iowa 189, 297 N.W. 278 (1941); Van Riper v. Van Riper, 2 N.J. Eq. 1 (1838).
When the amount of the debt is uncertain. Allen v. Etter, 92 lId. App. 297, 175

N.E. 286 (1931); Cloud v. Clinkinbeard, 47 Ky. (8 B.Mon.) 397 (1848). When
the debt is contracted after the will is made. Arkansas Nat'l Bank v. Aughenbaugh,
210 Ark. 749, 197 S.W. 2d 463 (1946); Delaureal v. Roguet's Succession, 177 La.
815, 149 So. 464 (1941). When the legacy is smaller than the debt or less beneficial.
Mitchell v. Vest, 157 Iowa 336, 136 N.W. 1054 (1912); Winner v. Shucart,
202 Mo. App. 176, 215 S.W. 905 (1919). When the debt arises from property which

the testator held in a trust capacity for the legatee. Fetrow v. Krause, sopra: Van
Riper v. Van Riper, supra; Buckner v. Martin, supra. For an extensive discussion of
the exceptions to the doctrine of satisfaction see Annots,

86 A.L.R. 6 (1933),

47 A.L.R. 2d 1140 (1956).
23. Ibid.
24. White v. Deering, 38 Cal. App. 433, 177 Pac. 516 (1918); Morris v.

Morris. 8 Del. 568 (1868); Smith v. Smith, 83 Mass. 129 (1861); German v. Gennan,

47 Tenn. 180 (1869).
25. No presumption arises that a legacy to a creditor is intended as a satisfaction
of the debt.
26. Young v. McKinnie, 5 Fla. 542 (1854).

While not referring to legacies to

creditors specifically, this court stated, "Tle intention of the testator . . . imposing
upon the legatee the obligation to elect, must be expressed or clearly implied in the will."
27. See note 1 s/upra.
28. See note 22 su/ira.
29. See Cases cited note 24 sura.
30. See Cases cited and accompanying text note 22 supra.

31. Ibid.

19581

CASES NOTED

be paid,3 2 and that the testator was holding the income for the petitioners in
a trust capacity. 33 In its reasons for departing from the weight of authority,
the court merely stated that the modem rule was more realistic, and that by
applying the modern rule, the necessity for the many exceptions to the general
34
rule would be eliminated.
The modem rule appears to be the more equitable of the two rules of
construction. In most cases involving legacies to creditors, the creditorlegatee is either a member of the household, a spouse, or a person who has
performed services for the testator during the testator's lifetime. For the
court to presume satisfaction of the debt by the legacy would in many cases
defeat the testator's desire to make a gift. The general rule was impartia 3 5
and none but the estate could benefit by the testator's silent intentions. It
seems that the Florida Supreme Court recognized the relationship of the
petitioners to the testator, and reasoned that the father would most probably
intend that his sons should receive a larger portion of his estate than his wife
whom he had married a relatively short time prior to his death. Although
the court did not comment upon this factor, it appears to the writer that in
this case and in most other cases where a close relationship between the
testator and the creditor-legatee exists, most courts will have a tendency to
resolve the dispute in favor of the litigant whose relationship is one of blood
or close friendship. Where both parties in interest are related by blood, it is
the writer's opinion that there is a tendency to favor the one with whom
the testator is more closely associated. If the courts were to allow such a
factor to be taken into consideration, the modern rule of construction
would be the more reasonable to apply, in view of the fact that the general
rule does not recognize privity as a factor in construing the testator's intent.
MYRON

32.
33.
34.
35.

Ibid.
Ibid.
96 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 1957).
See note 16 supra.
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